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We analyze the determinants of illiquidity and its impact on asset pricing for purely call-
auction traded stocks on Berlin Stock Exchange using 22 years of daily data (1892-1913).We 
use the Lesmond et al. (1999) measure of transaction costs to proxy illiquidity. We show that 
transaction costs were low and comparable to today’s costs. Liquidity was negatively corre-
lated with active informed trading, particularly being low for small and distressed stocks and 
in crises times. Liquidity concerns were a major driver of asset pricing: we find significant 
illiquidity level and illiquidity risk premia as well as an explicit premium for informed trad-
ing. 
JEL-Classification: G12, G14, N23 
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I.   Introduction 
In this paper, we empirically investigate theoretical predictions for the interplay of liquidity, 
informed trading and asset pricing using daily stock prices from the Berlin Stock Exchange 
from the period 1892-1913. The data are especially insightful for studying the link between 
information asymmetry and liquidity because the design of the market closely resembles the 
assumptions of sequential auction games (as in Kyle, 1985) with insiders observing the 
amount of noise trading (as in Rochet and Vila, 1994). More specifically, the Berlin Stock 
Exchange, which was then the major German stock exchange, was a call auction market with 
an official broker arranging one price fixing a day. Moreover, informed traders could submit 
their orders after having inspected the order book. This close alignment of actual market de-
sign and theoretical assumptions allows us to infer insider trading from stock price dynamics 
employing theoretical predictions: high positive serial correlation of stock returns indicate the 
presence of a strategically acting informed trader. Furthermore, the presence of informed trad-
ing justifies the application of Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999, further LOT) indirect 
measure of transaction costs as liquidity measure.1  
One of the implications of theoretical market microstructure models is that a high infor-
mation-to-noise ratio leads to low liquidity (e.g. Rochet and Vila, 1994, p. 145). We test this 
hypothesis indirectly, analyzing the impact of states with likely high information asymmetry 
on transaction costs. Such states are small and distressed companies as well as market crises. 
Beyond measuring transaction costs and identifying the link between information asymmetry 
and liquidity, we address three theoretical propositions with respect to liquidity premia. Here 
we strongly benefit from nearly absence of microstructure noise in the data: There are no bid-
ask spreads in the call auction market by design. This rules out the upward bias in liquidity 
premia, outlined in Asparouhova et al. (2009).  
First, both informed and uninformed traders dislike illiquid stocks and require a premium for 
holding them (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). By and large, the 
empirical literature supports this view (Asparouhova et al., 2009; Eleswarapu, 1997; 
Chalmers and Kadlec, 1998). Second, insider trading deteriorates wealth of liquidity traders 
and should deter their participation in stock trading subject to heavy informed trading (Dow, 
2004). However, if real investment is sufficiently information elastic, insider trading can be 
welfare enhancing (Bernhardt et al., 1995; Leland, 1992). Third, uninformed traders dislike 
stocks which are illiquid in bad times, as they can not be used to offset income flow shocks 
(Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). We assess these three hypotheses in an asset pricing frame-
work, where LOT transaction costs proxy for illiquidity, first order autocorrelation of daily 
returns proxy for informed trading and a regression coefficient of individual transaction costs 
shocks on market returns proxy for co-movement of illiquidity and market downturns. 
                                        
1   More generally, Pagano (1989) proves the close correlation of transaction costs and liquidity. 3 
We show that transaction costs at the Berlin Stock Exchange a century ago were pretty low 
and of about the same size as they are in modern financial markets. The LOT measure indi-
cates that the cost for a roundtrip transaction were about 0.97 percent of the share price. This 
compares to an estimate of 1.23 percent for the largest decile of firms listed at the New York 
Stock Exchange for the period 1963-1990 (Lesmond et al., 1999). We find support of the neg-
ative impact of the information-to-noise ratio on liquidity: transaction costs are higher for 
small stocks and after a year of negative returns; moreover, illiquidity increases in crises and 
decreases with turnover. Estimation of multifactor asset pricing models provides strong sup-
port of a liquidity premium: for one percentage point higher transaction costs, investors re-
quire about 3.6 percentage points higher expected annual return. We find some support of the 
informed trading premium: securities, which reveal symptoms of informed trading yield high-
er expected returns. The magnitude of this impact is strongly significant from an economic 
point of view. Moreover, we find a significant positive premium for liquidity risk: investors 
value securities, which transaction costs go up stronger in case of market downturns, signifi-
cantly lower. Thereby usual asset pricing benchmarks – market risk and size – turn out to 
have no impact on the cross-section of stock prices. 
Our finding of comparatively low transaction costs supports the theoretical superiority of call 
auction markets over the nowadays prevalent continuous trading or dealership markets (Pa-
gano and Roell, 1996). In contrast to the theoretical prediction, empirical results using data 
from modern markets are not as clear cut. For example, data from the Tel Aviv stock ex-
change show that prices and liquidity increase when stocks move from a call auction to con-
tinuous trading (Amihud et al, 1997; Kalay et al., 2002). However, data from the Singapore 
and London stock exchange illustrate that the introduction of opening and closing call auc-
tions decreases the extent of price manipulation and increases the extent of price discovery 
(Chang et al., 2008; Chelley-Steeley, 2008). Moreover, Pagano and Schwartz (2003) show 
that introduction of the closing auction on the Paris Bourse in 1996 led to the reduction of 
execution costs. In addition, experimental studies point out that call auction markets reduce 
asymmetric information between different groups of traders and lead to lower transaction 
costs, but reduce the speed of information processing (Schmitzlein, 1996; Theissen, 2000).  
Beyond its contribution to financial economics, our paper also supports recent findings from 
economic history showing that Germany’s historical stock market was quite efficient. Starting 
with the work of Weigt (2005), it has been shown that stock price differentials among German 
stock exchanges (Weigt, 2005: 199) and between the Berlin Stock Exchange and other major 
European stock exchanges were small (Baltzer, 2006), that stock prices reflected the risk and 
return characteristics of the shares quite well (Weigt, 2005: 224), and that the Berlin Stock 
Exchange was weakly information efficient (Gelman and Burhop, 2008). Furthermore, Gehrig 
and Fohlin (2006) estimate in a paper closely related to our work that the effective spreads of 
samples of Berlin traded shares during the benchmark years 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910 were 
low and decreasing in firm size.  4 
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. In Section II we give a short de-
scription of price fixing at the Berlin Stock Exchange at the turn of the 20
th century and de-
scribe our data sources. The LOT measure of round-trip transaction costs is illustrated in Sec-
tion III, along with a brief description of implemented econometric techniques. The results are 
presented in Section IV, followed by robustness checks in Section V and conclusion in Sec-
tion VI. 
II.   Market Structure and Data Description  
Shares were traded at the Berlin Stock Exchange six days peer week using a call auction 
mechanism. Prices were fixed once a day by official, government appointed brokers. The bro-
kers’ association allocated two official brokers to each stock listed at the exchange. They 
jointly fixed the official price of the share and they both had the duty to act as brokers for the 
stock, i.e. they could not decline to take orders. They started taking orders at noon and 
stopped taking orders not earlier than 1.30 p.m. and not later than 2 p.m. Orders were made 
orally by representatives of banks and other participants on the trading floor. The official bro-
ker orally repeated the order and his substitute recorded the order into the order book. The 
order book was arranged in four columns, one for unlimited buying orders, one for limited 
buying orders, one for unlimited selling orders, and one for limited selling orders. The official 
price had to reflect the true commerce at the stock exchange. At the official price, it had to be 
possible that all unlimited buy and sell orders as well as buy orders with a higher price limit 
and sell orders with a lower price limit were carried out. Whenever the official broker ex-
pected a major price change (i.e., a price change of more than one percent), he had to make a 
written announcement to the trading floor. Moreover, in this case, a state commissioner joined 
the two official brokers to monitor the price fixing. The first tentative price was prepared in 
public and all interested parties could attend this event. Moreover, it was still possible to place 
further orders or to cancel formerly made orders. Afterwards, the two official brokers went to 
the back office, where the official quotation was registered, signed by the state commissioner, 
and published in the official price list. Prices were quoted in percent of the face value of a 
share (typically 1,000 Mark) and the tick size, which could have relevance for price impact, 
was 0.05% of face value (Obst, 1921: 380, 386-392). 
Turning to transaction costs, we can distinguish three types of observable costs: taxes, broker 
fees, and bank fees. Transactions at German stock exchanges were taxed from 1881 onwards. 
More specifically for the period under consideration here, the stock market turnover tax was 
0.01 percent of the underlying transaction value between 1892 and April 1894. From May 
1894 onwards, the tax was doubled to 0.02 percent; another increase to 0.03 percent followed 
in October 1900. In addition to turnover taxes, the fees for brokers influence transaction costs. 
The fee for official brokers was 0.05 percent of the underlying transaction value (Gelman and 
Burhop, 2008). Furthermore, fees for the banks or other intermediaries varied between 0.1 and 
0.33 percent (Weigt, 2005: 192). In sum, broker fees, fees for intermediaries, and turnover 5 
taxes added up to a total cost for a roundtrip transaction (i.e., buying and selling of a share) in 
the range of 0.252 to 0.82 percent. 
To investigate the size of actual transaction costs and to evaluate whether they changed over 
time, we use daily stock prices for the period 31 December 1891 to 31 December 1913 col-
lected from the Berliner Börsenzeitung – Germany’s leading financial daily of the pre-1913 
period – for a sample of 27 continuously traded corporations from the Berlin stock exchange. 
The data were obtained from Gelman and Burhop (2008) who construct a daily stock market 
index for the period 1892-1913.2 The sample contains 6,692 daily returns. Descriptive statis-
tics of individual stocks are shown in Table I. The average daily return of an individual stock 
was slightly above 1 basis point and the average standard deviation with 94 basis points was 
about a half of the modern stock return volatility, but corresponds to the values reported by 
Gehrig and Fohlin (2006, p. 10, p. 12) for 1890, 1900 and 1910. Most of the stock returns are 
negatively skewed; all of them are leptokurtic, somewhat stronger than the modern day stock 
returns.  
To make some statements in how far our sample is representative for the whole universe of 
stocks traded on Berlin stock exchange, we compare the size of the companies included into 
the sample to the full cross-section in 1900 (the only data available to us for all listed stocks). 
From 826 listed companies there is market capitalization data only for 764 companies.3 The 
aggregate market capitalization of our sample accounts for 16% of the total market capitaliza-
tion. The average capitalization of all listed stocks with reported data was with 1.1 million 
Mark, about five times smaller than the average capitalization of the selected 27 companies, 
which amounted to 5.2 million in 1900. Both a simple t-test of the mean as well as a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test indicate that our sample is biased towards larger stock. In fact, 
the average size rank (in descending order) of our sample stocks is 170.1 compared to the ex-
pected 382.5; 5 out of the 10 largest companies listed on the exchange belong to the sample. 
                                        
2    Starting point for the index construction was the collection of daily share prices from the Berliner 
Börsenzeitung for a sample of 39 continuously listed non-insurance corporations from the Berlin stock 
exchange. Insurance companies were excluded from the index since trading in them was heavily restrict-
ed. They only issued vinkulierte Namensaktien, registered shares with restricted transferability. Then se-
curities with the portion of zero daily returns in the period under study of one third or higher were deleted 
from the index. 27 corporations remained.  














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Although our sample is skewed towards larger companies it spans a wide range of stocks in 
terms of size, from the largest (Deutsche Bank) to 590
th and 495
th from the top (Bochumer 
Bergwerk and Erdmannsdorfer Spinnerei correspondingly). The difference in distribution of 
logged market capitalization (which is supposed to stay in linear relationship with liquidity, 
see Gehring and Fohlin (2006) and Section IV) is by far not that striking, with averages of 
19.9 and 21.4 for 764 stocks and our sample respectively. The scope of zero returns seems 
also to be adequate: it ranges from 5% of trading days for Harpener Bergbau to 32% of trad-
ing days for Schlesische Leinen, with an average of 17% or approximately 51 days per year. 
This is slightly less than 22% reported by Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) for their sample of 114 
stocks from the Berlin stock exchange in 1900. Hence, our sample can be regarded as repre-
sentative of stocks traded on Berlin Stock Exchange at the turn of the 20
th century except for a 
small bias towards larger and more liquid stocks.  
Furthermore, the dynamic properties support our hypothesis on informed insider trading: for 
most of the stocks (15 out of 27) we report positive daily return autocorrelation. The latter 
makes also indirect effective spread measures, based on the bid-ask bounce, inapplicable. 
Beyond the reported properties of stock prices we have also obtained dividend data from the 
Berliner Börsenzeitung. As can be seen from the comparison of the average return on Gel-
man-Burhop performance index to the one of the price index the dividend yield was on aver-
age about 3.5% annually. 
Moreover, due to withholding of the turnover tax there is data on aggregate annual trade volume 
of all securities in Imperial Germany, which can serve as a proxy of the overall trading activity 
(obtained from Wetzel 1996). The aggregate trade volume time series behaves stationary with 
the approximately same value of stocks traded in 1913 as in 1892 (see Appendix 8). 
III.   Econometric technique   
In an information-efficient stock market, prices of stocks should incorporate new information 
instantaneously. However on the real-world stock exchanges the presence of transaction costs 
induces some deviations from such behaviour. Uncovering these deviations and analyzing 
them allows tracking back full transaction costs. 
This idea is exploited in a measure of transaction costs, proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999). 
The LOT measure reflects the total costs of a roundtrip transaction, which includes not only 
the difference between bid and ask prices, but also all further expenses carried by the trader, 
including the price change induced by the trade itself (so called price impact, see Lesmond 
2005). The LOT measure is based on the idea that transactions will only occur if the deviation 
of the market price from the true value of a stock is larger than the costs of a transaction. 
Thus, there are upper and lower thresholds – τi
l and τi
h – such that the measured return r is 
non-zero only if the true return exceeds the threshold: 9 
  *l* l
i,t it i i,t i
l* h
i,t i i,t i
*h* h
i,t it i i,t i
(1a)   r R  if r
(1b)   r 0 if  < r
(1c)   r R  if r .
=− τ < τ
=τ < τ
=− τ > τ
 
 
The true return depends on the market return rm,t in a linear way: r
*
i,t = βirm,t+ei,t. 
The estimated difference between the upper and the lower threshold – i.e. τi
h less τi
l – is a 
measure of the roundtrip transaction costs.  
We use the following maximum likelihood estimator, developed by Lesmond et al. (1999), to 
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Where Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Region 1 (indicated by 
“1” below the Π) corresponds to the negative expected latent variable when the observed is 
nonzero (
* ˆ 0 it r < , or equivalently rmt<0 and  0 it r ≠ ), region 2 to the positive expected latent 
variable if the observed is nonzero (rmt>0 and  0 it r ≠ ) and region 0 corresponds to the obser-
vation with zero observed returns ( 0 it r = ).  i σ  denotes the root out of the residual variance, 
measured over the non-zero returns region. 
The LOT measure thus includes the bid-ask spread, fees, transaction taxes, costs of infor-
mation acquirement and processing as well as price impact. Its size should be therefore larger 
than the regulated costs, i.e., the sum of broker fees, bank fees, and transaction taxes. We cal-
culate this measure for each company and each year, and then provide also aggregated esti-
mates across companies and years. 
In this paper we also calculate standard errors and confidence intervals for the transaction cost 
estimates, which is novel to the literature. It allows assessing the credibility of the estimates 
and inferring the significance of cross-section and time-series differences. We obtain standard 
errors for each stock i and year t from the standard expression: 
(3)  () () () ( ) () () var var 2cov , var
hl h h l l
it it it it it it it S στ τ τ τ τ τ =− = − +, 
where  () () ( ) var , var  and cov ,
hl h l
it it it it ττ τ τ  are the elements of the coefficient variance-
covariance matrix, yielded by maximum likelihood estimation in (2). To obtain standard er-
rors of annual averages we take into account possible cross-correlations of stock returns: 
(4)  () 2 27
t S σ
′ Σ⋅ Ω ⋅ Σ
= , 10 
where  () ( ) () 12 7 tt SS σσ ′ Σ=   is a row vector with standard errors for each stock ob-
tained for the year from (3) and Ωis a 27x27 correlation matrix of residuals from the limited 
dependent variable regressions, estimated by (2). For the standard errors of company transac-
tion costs averages (4) can be simplified, as we can assume independence of estimates across 
time: 





where  () () () 1892 1913 ii i SS σσ ′ Σ=   is a row vector with standard errors for the stock i ob-
tained for years 1892-1913. Confidence intervals are then estimated in a standard way under 
the assumption of normality of estimates. 
However, the precision of LOT transaction costs estimates relies on the explanatory power of 
the market model for stock returns. Thus, if further information sources or factors, such as 
returns on Fama-French (1993) small minus big (SMB) and high minus low (HML) factor 
portfolios have significant influence on individual stock returns, effective transaction costs 
may be substantially under- or overestimated.4 Yet, since the LOT-measure proved to be a 
good proxy for transaction costs in modern financial markets (see Goyenko et al. 2009; Les-
mond 2005) we see it as justified to use it for the historical data in our study. 
As we find considerable differences in transaction costs across companies, similar to Gehrig 
and Fohlin (2006), we run cross-section regressions of estimated average transaction costs on 
a set of explanatory variables: 
(6)  ii i SX α β ε ′ =+ +, 
where X denotes a vector of explanatory variables and β a vector of corresponding coeffi-
cients. However, as we observe remarkable time variation of transaction cost estimates we 
also run a panel regression: 
(7)  it it i t it SX v α βμ λ ′ =+ +++, 
where  i μ  denote cross-sectional individual effects,  t λ  denote year effects and  it v  is an idio-
syncratic error term. 
We rely on the standard technique in the asset pricing literature, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regression, when analyzing the impact of transaction costs on the cross-sectional variation of 
returns. It is based on the assumption, that expected returns of stocks are fully described by 
the linear combination of risk premia and factor loadings for all relevant factors: 
()  ′ =  8
ii EZ B λ , 
whereby  it it ft Z rr =−  denotes excess return,  ′ λ  is a transposed vector of risk-premia and Bi 
is a vector of factor loadings or risk characteristics of company i. Given the values of factor 
                                        
4   We are grateful to Christian Julliard for this comment. 11 
loadings for each stock in each period the risk premia are estimated running T cross-section 
regressions (one for each period) and averaging the estimates: 
() ′ = 9










The corresponding standard errors for each k-th element of the risk-premia vector are calcu-
lated from the corrected time variance of the estimated premia:  
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where  mt z  denotes the excess return of the market index. For the risk factor k to be priced the 
corresponding risk premium should be significantly different from zero. 
To obtain the illiquidity risk factor loadings 
IL
i β we calculate the sensitivity of unpredicted 
transaction costs to market movements using the following linear regression: 
() ωβ =+ ⋅ +  13
IL
it i mt it sr u . 
Unpredicted illiquidity is defined as the residual from a second order panel vector-
autoregression of transaction costs and annual stock returns (without dividends): 
() −− − =+ + + +
01 12 2 1 14





















 the residual vector; zit  
 
denotes the fraction of the market capitalisation of the company in the aggregate market capi-
talisation. A0 and C are vectors and A1 and A2 matrices of coefficients which are kept invaria-
ble across companies. 
IV.   Results 
1.   Estimated transaction costs  
Table II presents the averages across all shares of the annual LOT measure of round trip 
transaction costs as well as the average for the full sample period 1892-1913. 
The transaction costs at the Berlin Stock Exchange varied between 0.66 percent (in 1906) and 
1.68 percent (in 1901). The transaction costs were positive for any randomly chosen yearly 12 
period and they were always higher than the lower bound of the regulated fees. The average 
transaction costs amounted to 0.97 percent. Therefore, we broadly confirm the result present-
ed by Gehrig and Fohlin (2006), who estimated an average LOT measure of 0.71 percent for 
the four benchmark years 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910. Moreover, we find our transaction cost 
measures rather precisely estimated, with 95% confidence bounds being about ±10 basis 
points for most of the years. Significant illiquidity increases are revealed in 1901, 1910, 1912 
and 1913 relative to the respective previous years. Significant transaction cost decreases ap-
pear in 1894, 1902 and in 1911 as compared to the respective previous years.5 
TABLE II: ANNUAL AVERAGE OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Year LOT 
Std. error  95% confidence interval 
lower bound  upper bound 
1892 
1.454 0.062 1.333 1.575 
1893 
1.584 0.067 1.452 1.716 
1894 
1.072 0.050 0.975 1.169 
1895 
0.925 0.046 0.835 1.015 
1896 
0.805 0.039 0.729 0.881 
1897 
0.814 0.041 0.735 0.893 
1898 
0.908 0.044 0.821 0.995 
1899 
0.878 0.045 0.789 0.967 
1900 
1.029 0.057 0.917 1.141 
1901 
1.678 0.073 1.534 1.822 
1902 
0.977 0.224 0.537 1.417 
1903 
0.848 0.040 0.769 0.927 
1904 
0.825 0.041 0.744 0.906 
1905 
0.696 0.036 0.625 0.767 
1906 
0.658 0.034 0.591 0.725 
1907 
0.775 0.042 0.693 0.857 
1908 
0.846 0.045 0.757 0.935 
1909 
0.731 0.040 0.653 0.809 
1910 
1.039 0.046 0.949 1.129 
1911 
0.713 0.036 0.642 0.784 
1912 
0.883 0.044 0.797 0.969 
1913 
1.124 0.049 1.028 1.220 
Average 0.966 
0.012 0.942 0.990 
Own calculations based on daily returns for 27 stocks for the period 1892-1913. 
Expressed in percent of share price, equally weighted averages. Four outliers were dropped. Standard er-
rors are calculated taking into account cross-correlations between stocks, see (3)-(4) . Confidence interval is 
given by  () ,, 1.96 . . LOT t LOT t Ss e S ±  
 
                                        
5  The explosive increase in the standard deviation of the transaction cost estimates in 1902 is caused by the 
untypical behavior of Bochumer Bergwerk stock returns. 13 
It may come as a surprise that transaction costs were rather stable at the German stock ex-
change over the last century. We find that the 27 companies under study at the turn of the 
twentieth century had, on average, lower transaction costs than the 2
nd tier German blue chips 
at the turn of the twenty-first century: Applying the same technique to 47 MDAX companies 
for 1995-2009 yields an average LOT measure of 2.6 percent.6  
Evidence for other modern stock markets supports the impression that transaction costs were 
quite low at the Berlin Stock Exchange a century ago. Goyenko et al. (2009) document LOT 
measures for the Dow Jones Industrial Average index of 0.6 percent for the mid 1970s and 
1980s which is comparable to our results for the Berlin Stock Exchange index in mid 1900s. 
Very advantageous is the comparison to the modern emerging markets: Stocks in the Gelman-
Burhop (2008) index have lower transaction costs according to the LOT measure than any of 
the 31 emerging markets in the 1990s, covered in the study of Lesmond (2005). Their average 
transaction costs range from 2.3 percent for Taiwan to 18 percent for Russia. This reported 
superiority of the Berlin Stock Exchange at the turn of the 20
th century can be interpreted as 
evidence in favour of higher liquidity of call auctions compared to modern continuous trading 
(Pagano and Roell, 1996). Some portion of the observed higher liquidity could be also due to 
the broader sample of securities per country, analyzed in Lesmond (2005). 
2.   Explaining transaction costs   
Transaction costs varied across companies (see Appendix 1). Whereas textile companies, such 
as Deutsche Jute Spinnerei und Weberei and Erdmannsdorfer Spinnerei report LOT measures 
of 1.1 percent and 1.7 percent – which could be found also for median modern Chinese stock 
(Lesmond, 2005) – the transaction costs of banking sector stocks like Deutsche Bank (0.38 
percent) and Dresdner Bank (0.45 percent) is on the same level with Dow Jones companies in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Goyenko et al., 2009). These deviations however, cannot be attributed 
fully to industrial differences: companies included into the index stemming from the banking 
sector have a much higher market capitalization, e.g., the value of Deutsche Bank was on av-
erage 114 times the value of Erdmannsdorfer Spinnerei.  
The explanation may rather have informational origins: assuming the same share of trading 
relative to market capitalization across companies, the volume of trade for large companies 
was higher, allowing market makers to incorporate new information faster. Furthermore, large 
companies had probably better newspaper and analyst coverage, providing more thorough 
information to investors, thus decreasing information asymmetry. In turn, lower information 
asymmetry lessened the proportion of informed trading and thus provided for lower transac-
tion costs. 
                                        
6   The results are available upon request from the authors.  14 
Some evidence for the size hypothesis can be obtained from a simple cross section regression 
of average transaction costs on the log of the market capitalization. One should nevertheless 
be cautious as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) reveals the possibility of a reversed causal rela-
tionship: transaction costs can raise expected returns and thus reduce the market capitalization 
of a company. To avoid the endogeneity problem and to ensure the pre-determinacy we use 
the market capitalization of 1892 (which is measured at the beginning of the year) to explain 
company transaction costs averaged over the twenty-two year sample. For twenty-six compa-
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All estimates are highly significant and support the hypothesis that market capitalization de-
creases transaction costs: raising the market capitalization by 2.3 million Mark (what corre-
sponds to a one unit change of log market capitalization at the mean of the variable) leads to 
0.19 percentage points lower transaction costs.8 In addition, market capitalization explains 
almost two thirds of the inter-company transaction cost variation in our sample.9  
Another issue possibly relevant for transaction costs is tick size, which was 0.05 percent of 
the nominal (face) value of a stock. Thus, our transaction costs measure expressed in percent 
of the price could be higher for stocks with lower value. However, including the (log) price 
level at the beginning of the sample does not significantly help to explain the cross-section of 
transaction costs: While other coefficients barely change, the coefficient in front of the log 
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Given that prices fluctuate considerably during the 22 year period, using the first year market 
capitalization and price level could be insufficient to uncover the hypothesized relationship. 
Therefore, we run regressions of transaction costs on market capitalization and on both mar-
ket capitalization and price level in a balanced panel set-up with individual effects. We as-
                                        
7   We exclude Bochumer Bergwerk henceforth from the analysis, as it has unusually high transaction costs 
due to several months long periods of non-trading.  
8   Our estimation coincides with the one reported by Gehrig and Fohlin (2006) for the year 1900 for the log 
of the book value and is considerably close to their results for 1890 and 1910. 
9   Using equation (15) we could address the size bias, in the previous sub-section: Since the average (log) 
market cap in our sample is about 1.5 units higher than the population average in 1900, the population av-
erage transaction costs can be expected to be about 29 basis points higher than reported in Table 2. Still 
they turn out to be lower than they are in modern emerging markets and for constituents of 2-tier devel-
oped market indices. 15 
sume that trade volume is proportional to market capitalization not only across companies but 
also across time. If higher trading volume of larger firms is associated with lower transaction 
costs, then we should find the same relationship in the panel regression as in the cross section 
regressions (15) and (16). As market capitalization is clearly non-stationary over the 22 year 
sample, we use the fraction of the overall market capitalization contributed by each company. 
Furthermore we include time-effects to account for changes in the overall market capitaliza-
tion. As an alternative measure we include the aggregate annual trade volume of all securities 
in Imperial Germany per year, which under our assumption of proportionality, should capture 
changes in the overall market capitalization. In order to treat the non-stationarity of log price 
levels we take first differences and obtain returns (neglecting dividends). To address the pre-
viously outlined possible problem of reversed causality we use lagged log price changes. 
Since market capitalization is reported for the beginning of each year, we do not face possible 
reverse causality with regard to this variable. We perform random effects and fixed effects 
estimations, while the result of the Hausman test allows using random effects. Since transac-
tion costs are believed to be rather persistent (Bekaert et al. 2007, Amihud 2002), we use 
White period standard errors, which account for clustering by stocks. Furthermore, we direct-
ly address the issue of persistence including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor in 
our last specification. To avoid the problem of collinearity of the lagged dependent variable 
and the error term we transform all variables using forward orthogonal deviations, following 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and then apply general method of moments estimation for dynam-
ic panel data (further DPD-GMM). 10 
Table III: Panel regression to explain the size of transaction costs 
  (1) FE  (2) FE  (2b)FE  (3) FE  (4) FE  (5) RE  (6) GMM 














Sit-1          0.37*** 
(0.08) 
































t1901      0.26*** 
(0.08) 
    
t1913      0.25*** 
(0.07) 
    
Time  effects  Y Y N  N N N  N 
Firm  effects  Y Y Y  Y Y N  Y 
R2  0.56 0.60 0.45  0.48 0.46 0.27  0.63 
Estimates of LS individual effects models as well as DPD-GMM for the transaction costs (LOT measures) for the sample 
period from 1892 to 1913 for the panel of 26 companies of the type:  () it it i t it SX v α βμ λ ′ =+ + + +. White peri-
od standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. R2 is calculated as one minus the fraction of the residual variance to the variance of the dependent variable. 
 
Columns 1-2 and 5-6 in Table III support the hypothesis: relative market capitalization has a 
significant negative impact. According to column 1, if the share of market capitalization in the 
                                        
10   The lagged LOT measure is instrumented by its second lag, all other explanatory variables are instru-
mented by themselves.  16 
index increases by one standard deviation (5 percentage points) transaction costs decrease by 
0.16 percentage points. The statistical significance of the size variable depends on the specifi-
cation: it is the highest in the random effects specification (column 5) but diminishes in fixed 
effects specifications without time effects (columns 2b-4). The reasons are probably twofold: 
First, market capitalization is less variable in time than in cross section: In fact, the between 
variance of the market capitalization variable constitutes about 96% of its overall variance. 
Second, as we omit time effects in fixed effects specifications (columns 2b-4) standard errors 
surge. Including the omitted lagged dependent variable in the DPD-GMM specification (col-
umn 6) makes the estimates more efficient and substantially reduces their variance, which 
makes them significant on the 5% level. 11 
Previous year log price changes have a negative impact on transaction costs, which is signifi-
cant in all specifications without time-effects (columns 2b-6 of Table III). This result supports 
the findings of Griffin et al. (2004) and Bekaert et al. (2007), who find that returns help pre-
dicting liquidity on modern financial markets. Furthermore, time effects play a substantial 
role: they explain about 15 percent of the transaction costs variation (compare explanatory 
power in columns 2 and 2b). About one-seventh of the explanatory power of time can be at-
tributed to two years: 1901 and 1913 (see column 3) – which are known to have caused wors-
ening information efficiency (Gelman and Burhop, 2008). In 1901 the bankruptcy of Leip-
ziger Bank, one of Germany’s largest banks, caused a stock exchange turmoil and possibly 
high degree of uncertainty about fair prices of shares which forced speculative traders to act 
more conservative, thus reducing liquidity. In 1913, the fear of a Balkan war led to similar 
effects on the financial market. 
The log of the German securities trading volume during year t, TVt, (see columns 4-6 of Table 
3) as an indicator of the overall trading activity picks up only about 1% of the variance of 
transaction costs, but is highly significant. The lower R² of the random effects vs. the fixed 
effect specification suggest that about 16 percent of the variance is explained by cross-
sectional individual firm effects.  
Standard fixed and random effects regression residuals exhibit a strong and highly significant 
autocorrelation.12 In fact, DPD-GMM in column 6 reveals a highly significant autoregressive 
coefficient for illiquidity, supporting earlier empirical evidence of the persistence of transac-
tion costs (Bekaert et al. 2007, Amihud 2002). Our estimates of the impact of previous period 
returns, company size and turnover stay about the same compared to the corresponding static 
specification (column 4), but the standard errors decrease substantially for size and previous 
period returns. This implies that neglecting the dynamics does not substantially bias the re-
sults, but does worsen the efficiency of estimates. 
                                        
11   The result of a negative correlation of transaction costs with size proves to be rather stable over time: An 
equivalent to column 1 panel regression of transaction costs of 47 MDAX stocks over 1999-2009 on the 
fraction of overall market capitalization yields a coefficient of -5.34, which is also significant on the 10% 
level and explains about 6% of the variation of transaction costs. Results are available on demand.  
12   Details are available on demand 17 
Hence, we find some support for increasing illiquidity with rising information asymmetry or a 
larger information-to-noise ratio: In particular, a decline in company size leads to higher il-
liquidity. The evidence is weaker for the relevance of corporate distress periods for illiquidity. 
Contemporaneous backdrops in trading activity and crises deteriorate liquidity significantly.  
3.   Transaction costs, liquidity, and asset prices 
The large dispersion of transaction costs should be reflected in asset pricing. Here we test 
three hypotheses of the liquidity impact.  
First, as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) noted, given the set of investment opportunities, in-
vestors should avoid assets which have lower liquidity yielding same returns. This should in 
the long run decrease the price of such securities and raise their return. Therefore, in the long 
run one should find a positive relation between transaction costs and expected returns in the 
cross-section.  
Second, we hypothesize that noise traders (ordinary, non-informed investors) should in the 
long run avoid stocks with pronounced informed trading (proxied by positive autocorrelation), 
since in these stocks noise traders’ orders are more likely to get matched if the information is 
unfavorable. Thus, there should be a premium for informed trading on top of the transaction 
costs. 
Third, inline with Liquidity-adjusted CAPM of Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we expect a 
premium for liquidity risk. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) suggest three liquidity risk channels: 
the covariance of individual stock liquidity with market liquidity, the covariance of individual 
stock returns with market liquidity and the covariance of individual stock liquidity with mar-
ket returns. As the authors report strong correlation between these measures and with the level 
of illiquidity, we decide to use only the channel with the strongest economic effect, namely 
the sensitivity of individual stock illiquidity to market return (Acharya and Pedersen 2005, p. 
398).13 
To perform the tests we analyze excess returns, calculated as total returns (price changes plus 
dividends) less the risk free rate. Including dividends is important as the companies may com-
pensate investors with higher dividends for lower prices. In line with the asset pricing litera-
ture, we use monthly return data. We run Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Shanken 
(1992) corrections for the traditional CAPM and several multifactor extensions, including 
                                        
13   Gernandt et al. (2011) choose another risk channel – sensitivity of individual stock returns to market li-
quidity shocks – and find no significant impact on asset pricing on the contemporary (1901-1919) Swe-
dish stock market. 18 
transaction costs, serial daily return autocorrelation, liquidity risk beta and we control for 
size.14  
 
Table IV. Results of cross-sectional asset pricing regressions 
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       -.0020*** 
(.0007) 
Average R2 0.07  0.12  0.16  0.20  0.17 
# of stocks  26  26  26  26  26 
# of cross-sections T 264  252  252  252  252 
Estimates of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for the sample period from 1892 to 1913 for 26 companies. Reported 
coefficient values  k λ  are averages of 264 (252 for columns (2)-(5)) regression estimates of the type: 
it t t it i Z Bu α ′ =+ + λ , where  t′ λ  denotes the transposed vector of risk premia and Bit denotes the vector of risk 















, according to the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure with Shanken (1992) correc-
tion, and are reported in parenthesis. Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respec-
tively. Average R2 is an arithmetic mean of R2 for each cross-section. 
 
The liquidity risk beta is calculated as a regression slope of unpredicted individual illiquidity 
shocks on market return shocks. Unpredicted illiquidity shocks are residuals of a panel 
VAR(2) of annual returns and illiquidity measures (analog to Bekaert et al., 2007). As the risk 
free rate proxy we use the money market rate obtained from the NBER (series: 13018). Size is 
the log of market capitalization and varies on the annual basis. Transaction costs are our LOT 
estimates, which also vary yearly. Market betas and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient 
of daily price percentage changes are constant for each company throughout the sample. We 
also include a constant as we do not demean the explanatory variables. 
As expected, the premium for transaction costs is significant and positive in all specifications 
(see Table IV). A one percentage point higher transaction cost (which is equivalent to moving 
from the most liquid stocks to the bottom of our sample, see Appendix 1) raises expected 
                                        
14   We are aware of possible within firm and within month error clustering, as outlined in Petersen (2009). 
Having a considerably greater time dimension than cross-section dimension makes the within month clus-
tering the primary problem. However, as Petersen (2009) shows, Fama-MacBeth (1973) technique is able 
to address it adequately. Turning to within firm clustering, it could be a problem in our data at a first 
glance, as our right hand side variables are very persistent, since transaction costs change only yearly and 
betas and autocorrelation coefficient stay constant throughout the sample. But our dependent variable – 
return – is not persistent at all, thus yielding slightly negatively correlated residuals and thus nullifying 
the problem of underestimation of standard errors. 19 
monthly return by 25 to 33 basis points or 3% to almost 4% annually, depending on the speci-
fication. This range covers the 3.5% annual premium obtained by Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) for the US value-weighted portfolios in 1964-1999. The illiquidity premium estimates 
also suggest an average holding period of three to four months, which is required for returns 
net of transaction costs to become equal across different stocks. 
Furthermore, our proxy for insider trading is positive with tendency to significance (see Table 
IV, column 4): stocks, which daily price percentage changes are positively autocorrelated 
have on average higher expected returns. This implies that informed trading rather deterio-
rates the value of a company and for sure does not increase wealth. The effect of investing in 
stock with the highest autocorrelation coefficient of 0.11 instead of in stock with the lowest 
one of -0.20 would lead to an increase in expected monthly returns by 33 basis point or about 
4% annually. 
The illiquidity risk premium is, as predicted by theory, negative. The sign is due to undesired 
negative sensitivity of illiquidity to market movements: negative market shocks increase il-
liquidity and vice versa. Thus, the expected return is higher for those stocks, which liquidity 
deteriorates during market downturns. Our result for the premium on the individual illiquidity 
sensitivity to market returns is statistically highly significant, inline with results obtained by 
Lee (2011) for a large battery of stocks from 54 countries and 1988-2007 sample period (Lee 
2011, Tables 3-4), whereas Acharya and Pedersen (2005) for modern US data fail to find sig-
nificant premium for this liquidity risk channel alone. The economic extent of the liquidity 
risk effect in our data is rather strong: if sensitivity to liquidity risk moves from 0 to -0.7 
(about one standard deviation) the expected return increases by 14 basis points per month. 
The difference between maximum and minimum liquidity risk sensitivity is about four times 
as large and would lead to 55 basis points increase (see Appendix 7). Annualized the full 
range move in autocorrelation would yield a 6.6% return increase, which by far exceeds the 
overall liquidity risk effects of 1.1%, reported by Acharya and Pedersen (2005, p.398) for US 
and 1.5% reported by Lee (2011) for the global market, but is comparable to the economic 
effect of 5.6% for modern emerging markets (Lee 2011, p. 146).  
Moreover, our results reveal that CAPM does not hold since the market risk premium is in-
significant in all four specifications, which is consistent with empirical results of Gernandt et 
al. (2011) for the contemporary (1901-1919) Swedish stock market and with results of Achar-
ya and Pedersen (2005) and Lee (2011) for modern US and global data. In addition, there is 
no significant size effect, which supports Lee (2011) results for modern stocks except emerg-
ing markets. Seemingly, size to a large extent proxies liquidity risk, which is much better cap-
tured here by transaction costs. However, the inclusion of the size variable increases, due to 
correlation with transaction costs, the standard error of the latter coefficient, which leads to 
some loss in significance of illiquidity. 
The results of this subsection suggest, that liquidity solely drives asset pricing and causes ex-
pected return variation of the magnitude of 7% (liquidity level plus informed trading differ-20 
ences) to 9.6% (liquidity level plus liquidity risk differences) per year. It shows that investors 
value liquidity even more in a more efficient call auction market design than what has been 
reported for continuous trading (or combined) mechanisms for modern US or global markets 
(Acharya and Pedersen 2005, Lee 2011). Opposite to Bernhardt et al., (1995) and Leland 
(1992) we find that active informed trading seems to destroy company value by considerable 
amount (about 4% p.a.).  
 
V.   Robustness checks 
The results of the previous section rely upon the assumption that the standard LOT measure is 
a good proxy of illiquidity. To address concerns that this is not the case, especially if the 
standard estimate of LOT may be distorted by a falsely specified function of latent returns 
(market model), we repeat the tests using an extended market model, which includes excess 
returns to the SMB portfolio as a risk factor.  
To construct the SMB portfolio we form “small” and “big” portfolios, which are equally 
weighted portfolios of the smallest five and largest five companies respectively.  Portfolios 
are rebalanced at the beginning of each year based on 1 January market capitalization. SMB 
factor return is calculated as a return of a portfolio with a unit long position in the “small” 
portfolio and a unit short position in the “big” portfolio. The list of the constituent companies 
is in the Appendix 5. In fact, the augmented market model does explain non-zero returns suf-
ficiently better than a simple market model: average R-squared increases from 16% to 25%. 
The fit increases tremendously for small stocks (see Appendix 2 and 6). The transaction cost 
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Here region 1 (indicated by “1” below the Π) corresponds to the negative expected latent var-
iable when the observed is nonzero (
* ˆ 0 it r < , or equivalently ββ +<
,, , 0
M i mt SMB i SMB t rr  and 
0 it r ≠ ), region 2 – to the positive expected latent variable if observed is nonzero 
(ββ +>
,, , 0
M i mt SMB i SMB t rr and 0 it r ≠ ), and region 0 corresponds to the observation with zero 
observed returns ( 0 it r = ). Note that since we cannot impose any restrictions on sensitivity to 21 
SMB risk, we have to pre-estimate the latent variable to define the regions and to solve the 
likelihood iteratively. 
Obtained transaction costs are generally rather similar: the correlation with the LOT measure 
in a panel set-up is about 97%, the average for the period is very close to the LOT average 
with 0.94 percentage points (see Appendix 3 and 4). However, the Augmented LOT measure 
has higher variance in the cross-section: transaction costs for low-liquidity stocks tend to be 
higher and for the high-liquidity ones tend to be lower. 
Qualitative findings on liquidity and transaction costs drivers remain the same: liquidity is 
lower for small and distressed stocks and declines in crises periods (Table V).  
 
Table V: Panel regression to explain the size of transaction costs – Alternative LOT 
  (1) FE  (2) FE  (2b) FE  (3) FE  (4) FE  (5) RE  (6) GMM 














Sit-1         0.355*** 
(0.107) 
































t1901      0.266*** 
(0.082) 
    
t1913      0.230*** 
(0.080) 
    
Time effects  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  N 
Firm effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y 
R2  0.54 0.58  0.44 0.45 0.45 0.27 0.76 
Estimates of LS individual effects models as well as GMM for the augmented LOT measure per year for the sample period 
from 1892 to 1913 for the panel of 26 companies of the type:  () it it i t it SX v α βμ λ ′ =+ + + +. White period 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. R2 is calculated as one minus the fraction of the residual variance to the variance of the dependent variable. 
 
Asset pricing analysis with Augmented LOT supports our previous findings (see Table VI): 
there is a substantial liquidity premium of about the same magnitude, which is statistically 
significant at least on the 10% level if we do not include the size characteristics. The informed 
trading proxy tends to lead to higher expected returns, and the liquidity risk premium is of a 
similarly high economic and statistic significance. Thus, the choice of possibly incomplete 
model for the latent returns seems not to distort our finding on drivers of illiquidity as well as 





Table VI: Results of asset pricing regressions – Alternative LOT 
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       -.0018*** 
(.0007) 
Average R2 0.07  0.12  0.16  0.19 0.17 
# of stocks  26  26  26  26  26 
# of cross-sections T 264  252  252  252  252 
 
Estimates of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for the sample period from 1892 to 1913 for 26 companies. Reported 
coefficient values  k λ  are averages of 264 (252 for columns (2)-(4)) regression estimates of the type: 
it t t it i Z Bu α ′ =+ + λ , where  t′ λ  denotes the transposed vector of risk premia and Bit denotes the vector of risk 















, according to the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure with Shanken (1992) correc-
tion, and are reported in parenthesis. Values marked with ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respec-
tively. Average R2 is an arithmetic mean of R2 for each cross-section. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We find an early call auction market at the Berlin Stock Exchange about as liquid as modern 
stock exchanges with transaction costs averaging about one percent between 1892 and 1913 
according to the measure proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999). Thus, transaction costs a centu-
ry ago were quite similar to today’s cost, possibly due to the efficient trading design. We find 
some indirect but robust evidence that the ratio of informed to uninformed investors drives 
liquidity: we find significantly higher transaction costs for cases, where this ratio is believed 
to be higher: for small and distressed stocks, for the periods of rapid and stark market down-
turns. 
Even for this rather liquid call auction market we find that liquidity seems to be the main 
driver of asset pricing: we find economically and statistically significant liquidity level and 
liquidity risk premia, whereas market risk has no impact. Therefore, we support the literature 
on the modern markets with continuous trading and can conclude that stock liquidity seem to 
matter irrespective of market design and how liquid the market is on average. This has impli-
cations for financial authorities and market agents. The former should take measures of en-
hancing liquidity – either through a more efficient market design or by attracting trading ac-
tivity – which could be rather costly but still welfare enhancing. The latter, e. g. portfolio 
investors, have to consider (relative) illiquidity level and risk even on highly liquid markets. 23 
We find also some weak evidence of an informed trading premium, thus active insider trading 
seems to deteriorate value on top of general illiquidity. This would imply that large stock 
holders should abstain from frequent trading on insider information to maximize their end-of-
the-holding-period wealth.  
Hence the impact of informed trading on illiquidity and on asset pricing deserves further clos-
er study. In this context future research could answer limitations of the current paper, in the 
first place constructing alternative proxies for informed trading from the data available for 
modern stock markets. 24 
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1  AG für Anilinfabrikation 
0.943 0.026  0.892  0.994 
2 Allgemeine  Elektricitätsgesellschaft 
0.520 0.020  0.482  0.558 
3 Berlin-Anhaltinische  Maschinenbau 
0.902 0.025  0.854  0.950 
4  Bochumer Bergwerk (Lit C) 
3.164 0.269  2.637  3.691 
5  Bank für Handel und Industrie 
0.543 0.014  0.516  0.570 
6 Deutsche  Bank 
0.384 0.016  0.353  0.415 
7 Dresdner  Bank 
0.446 0.015  0.417  0.475 
8  Deutsche Jute Spinnerei und Weberei 
1.109 0.025  1.060  1.158 
9 Deutsche  Spiegelglas 
1.097 0.027  1.045  1.149 
10 Erdmannsdorfer  Spinnerei 
1.689 0.035  1.621  1.757 
11 Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerksgesellschaft 
0.427 0.021  0.387  0.467 
12 Gerresheimer  Glashütten 
1.284 0.029  1.228  1.340 
13 Hallesche  Maschinenfabriken 
1.112 0.029  1.054  1.170 
14  Harpener Bergbau AG 
0.425 0.022  0.383  0.467 
15  Kattowitzer AG für Bergbau und Eisen 
0.667 0.020  0.627  0.707 
16 Maschinenfabrik  Kappel 
1.239 0.033  1.174  1.304 
17 Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei 
1.135 0.028  1.081  1.189 
18  Oberschlesische Portland-Cement AG 
1.094 0.013  1.069  1.119 
19 Rheinische  Stahlwerke 
0.781 0.030  0.723  0.839 
20 Rositzer  Zuckerfabrik 
1.053 0.025  1.005  1.101 
21 Schaaffhausen’scher  Bankverein  0.572 
0.028 0.518  0.626 
22  Chemische Fabrik vormals Schering 
1.001 0.025  0.952  1.050 
23  Schlesische  Zinkhütten 
0.959 0.022  0.916  1.002 
24 Schlesische  Leinen-Industrie 
1.183 0.022  1.139  1.227 
25 Schultheiss  Brauerei 
0.684 0.018  0.650  0.718 
26 Siemens  Glas-Industrie 
0.776 0.018  0.740  0.812 
27 Stettiner  Chamottewaren 
0.905 0.027  0.852  0.958 
Source: Gelman and Burhop (2008), own calculations. Standard errors are calculated assuming independence of transac-
tion cost estimates across time. 28 





1  AG für Anilinfabrikation 
0.092322 
2 Allgemeine  Elektricitätsgesellschaft 
0.329350 
3 Berlin-Anhaltinische  Maschinenbau 
0.116825 
4  Bochumer Bergwerk (Lit C) 
0.065104 
5  Bank für Handel und Industrie 
0.351353 
6 Deutsche  Bank 
0.397444 
7 Dresdner  Bank 
0.488626 
8  Deutsche Jute Spinnerei und Weberei 
0.073646 
9 Deutsche  Spiegelglas 
0.051038 
10 Erdmannsdorfer  Spinnerei 
0.030019 
11 Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerksgesellschaft
0.508946 
12 Gerresheimer  Glashütten 
0.054653 
13 Hallesche  Maschinenfabriken 
0.043489 
14  Harpener Bergbau AG 
0.462738 
15  Kattowitzer AG für Bergbau und Eisen 
0.192785 
16 Maschinenfabrik  Kappel 
0.043751 
17 Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei 
0.057130 
18  Oberschlesische Portland-Cement AG 
0.096344 
19 Rheinische  Stahlwerke 
0.264628 
20 Rositzer  Zuckerfabrik 
0.065095 
21 Schaaffhausen’scher  Bankverein 
0.269807 
22  Chemische Fabrik vormals Schering 
0.072648 
23  Schlesische  Zinkhütten 
0.089340 
24 Schlesische  Leinen-Industrie 
0.010887 
25 Schultheiss  Brauerei 
0.043544 
26 Siemens  Glas-Industrie 
0.054630 
27 Stettiner  Chamottewaren 
0.105594 
  Average 
0.164138 
Numbers in the third column represent for each stock averages of 22 R-squared values obtained from yearly market model 
regressions for non-zero return observations. 29 
 
Appendix 3: Average alternative transaction costs 
 
Year ALOT 
Std. error  95% confidence interval 
lower bound  upper bound 
1892 
1.475 0.060 1.358 1.592 
1893 
1.601 0.062 1.480 1.722 
1894 
1.029 0.038 0.954 1.105 
1895 
0.903 0.031 0.842 0.964 
1896 
0.763 0.028 0.709 0.818 
1897 
0.797 0.029 0.740 0.853 
1898 
0.877 0.032 0.815 0.940 
1899 
0.834 0.035 0.765 0.903 
1900 
0.975 0.038 0.901 1.049 
1901 
1.785 0.102 1.585 1.985 
1902 
0.952 0.114 0.729 1.175 
1903 
0.841 0.028 0.787 0.896 
1904 
0.793 0.029 0.737 0.850 
1905 
0.657 0.025 0.608 0.705 
1906 
0.617 0.026 0.565 0.669 
1907 
0.702 0.029 0.645 0.760 
1908 
0.816 0.031 0.755 0.878 
1909 
0.666 0.027 0.612 0.719 
1910 
1.030 0.034 0.964 1.096 
1911 
0.689 0.026 0.638 0.741 
1912 
0.816 0.028 0.762 0.870 
1913 
1.062 0.041 0.981 1.143 
Average 
0.940 0.010 0.921 0.960 
Own calculations based on daily returns for 27 stocks for the period 1892-1913. 
Expressed in percent of share price, equally weighted averages. Four outliers were dropped. Standard er-
rors are calculated taking into account cross-correlations between stocks. Confidence interval is given by 
() ±
,, 1.96 . .
ALOT t ALOT t Ss e S  
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1  AG für Anilinfabrikation 
0.966 0.023 0.921  1.011 
2 Allgemeine  Elektricitätsgesellschaft 
0.451 0.015 0.421  0.480 
3 Berlin-Anhaltinische  Maschinenbau 
0.893 0.022 0.851  0.935 
4  Bochumer Bergwerk (Lit C) 
3.334 0.171 2.998  3.669 
5  Bank für Handel und Industrie 
0.454 0.011 0.433  0.474 
6 Deutsche  Bank 
0.342 0.008 0.325  0.358 
7 Dresdner  Bank 
0.361 0.009 0.343  0.378 
8  Deutsche Jute Spinnerei und Weberei 
1.011 0.023 0.966  1.055 
9 Deutsche  Spiegelglas 
1.024 0.025 0.974  1.073 
10 Erdmannsdorfer  Spinnerei 
1.524 0.033 1.460  1.588 
11 Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerksgesellschaft 
0.315 0.013 0.290  0.341 
12 Gerresheimer  Glashütten 
1.382 0.032 1.319  1.446 
13 Hallesche  Maschinenfabriken 
1.126 0.024 1.078  1.174 
14  Harpener Bergbau AG 
0.324 0.014 0.297  0.351 
15  Kattowitzer AG für Bergbau und Eisen 
0.623 0.016 0.591  0.655 
16 Maschinenfabrik  Kappel 
1.129 0.028 1.074  1.183 
17 Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei 
1.205 0.040 1.127  1.284 
18  Oberschlesische Portland-Cement AG 
0.994 0.025 0.945  1.043 
19 Rheinische  Stahlwerke 
0.706 0.020 0.668  0.744 
20 Rositzer  Zuckerfabrik 
1.008 0.026 0.958  1.058 
21 Schaaffhausen’scher  Bankverein 
0.530 0.011 0.509  0.552 
22  Chemische Fabrik vormals Schering 
1.022 0.024 0.974  1.070 
23  Schlesische  Zinkhütten 
0.998 0.023 0.952  1.044 
24 Schlesische  Leinen-Industrie 
1.249 0.026 1.198  1.300 
25 Schultheiss  Brauerei 
0.709 0.015 0.679  0.739 
26 Siemens  Glas-Industrie 
0.783 0.017 0.749  0.817 
27 Stettiner  Chamottewaren 
0.946 0.024 0.900  0.993 
Source: Gelman and Burhop (2008), own calculations. Standard errors are calculated assuming independence of transac-
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1  AG für Anilinfabrikation 
0.107059 
2 Allgemeine  Elektricitätsgesellschaft 
0.348324 
3 Berlin-Anhaltinische  Maschinenbau 
0.141805 
4  Bochumer Bergwerk (Lit C) 
0.074821 
5  Bank für Handel und Industrie 
0.369678 
6 Deutsche  Bank 
0.411315 
7 Dresdner  Bank 
0.508748 
8  Deutsche Jute Spinnerei und Weberei 
0.229672 
9 Deutsche  Spiegelglas 
0.158531 
10 Erdmannsdorfer  Spinnerei 
0.250039 
11 Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerksgesellschaft
0.520432 
12 Gerresheimer  Glashütten 
0.065981 
13 Hallesche  Maschinenfabriken 
0.097760 
14  Harpener Bergbau AG 
0.469876 
15  Kattowitzer AG für Bergbau und Eisen 
0.199731 
16 Maschinenfabrik  Kappel 
0.304432 
17 Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei 
0.069061 
18  Oberschlesische Portland-Cement AG 
0.294411 
19 Rheinische  Stahlwerke 
0.272544 
20 Rositzer  Zuckerfabrik 
0.126384 
21 Schaaffhausen’scher  Bankverein 
0.289018 
22  Chemische Fabrik vormals Schering 
0.082454 
23  Schlesische  Zinkhütten 
0.105702 
24 Schlesische  Leinen-Industrie 
0.016795 
25 Schultheiss  Brauerei 
0.047726 
26 Siemens  Glas-Industrie 
0.078423 
27 Stettiner  Chamottewaren 
0.130465 
  Average 
0.245094 
Numbers in the third column represent for each stock averages of 22 R-squared values obtained from yearly augmented mar-
ket model regressions for non-zero return observations.   33







Liquidity risk beta 
1  AG für Anilinfabrikation 
0.91 -1.03 
2 Allgemeine  Elektricitätsgesellschaft 
1.07 0.03 
3 Berlin-Anhaltinische  Maschinenbau 
0.84 -0.11 
5  Bank für Handel und Industrie 
0.89 -0.21 
6 Deutsche  Bank 
0.77 -0.33 
7 Dresdner  Bank 
1.07 -0.45 
8  Deutsche Jute Spinnerei und Weberei 
0.73 -1.62 
9 Deutsche  Spiegelglas 
0.67 -1.10 
10 Erdmannsdorfer  Spinnerei 
0.67 -0.49 
11 Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerksgesellschaft 
1.31 0.02 
12 Gerresheimer  Glashütten 
0.43 -1.28 
13 Hallesche  Maschinenfabriken 
0.78 -1.29 
14  Harpener Bergbau AG 
1.36 -0.17 
15  Kattowitzer AG für Bergbau und Eisen 
0.88 -0.87 
16 Maschinenfabrik  Kappel 
0.82 -1.92 
17 Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei 
0.89 0.12 
18  Oberschlesische Portland-Cement AG 
0.95 -0.72 
19 Rheinische  Stahlwerke 
1.35 -0.79 
20 Rositzer  Zuckerfabrik 
0.81 -1.07 
21 Schaaffhausen’scher  Bankverein 
0.77 -0.14 
22  Chemische Fabrik vormals Schering 
0.74 0.79 
23  Schlesische  Zinkhütten 
0.63 -1.60 
24 Schlesische  Leinen-Industrie 
0.46 -0.32 
25 Schultheiss  Brauerei 
0.39 -1.67 
26 Siemens  Glas-Industrie 
0.59 -0.91 
27 Stettiner  Chamottewaren 
0.86 0.83 
  Average 
0.92 -0.60 
Market beta is the slope of regression of monthly stock excess returns on excess market returns. Liquidity risk beta is the 
slope of regression of yearly individual stock illiquidity shocks on excess market returns.   34
Appendix 8. Trade volume of stocks in Imperial Germany, 1892-1913 
 
























Source: Wetzel (1996) 
 
 
 
 